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Abstract 
This study extends the literature on the determinants of NPL. I investigate whether banks anticipate non-performing 
loans by making balance sheet adjustments. This study draws insight into the actions taken by credit risk management 
teams and bank managers to minimize the size of non-performing loans. After examining 82 banks from US, Europe, 
Asia and Africa, the result indicate that banks adjust the level of loan loss reserves and loan growth to minimize the size 
of NPLs. Our results do not show evidence that loan diversification minimizes NPLs. Further, I find that banks in 
developing countries reduce loan growth when they expect high NPL while banks in developed countries do not 
anticipate the level of NPL by adjusting loan growth. Further, I find that post-crisis Basel regulation did not lead to a 
decrease in the size of NPLs among banks in developed countries but appear to minimize NPLs in some developing 
countries. Overall, the significance and predictive power of each bank-specific factor (excluding loan diversification), 
regulatory variable and macroeconomic indicator in explaining NPLs depends on regional factors (less significantly) 
and country-specific factors (more significantly).  
Keywords: Non-performing Loans, Credit risk, Macroeconomic determinants, Bank specific determinants, Banking. 
1. Introduction 
The deterioration in the quality of bank assets continues to take centre stage in banking research and policy discuss 
since the 2008 financial crisis. The need to predict early warning signals of NPLs is increasingly becoming important to 
bank managers and credit controllers. Prior studies identified several determinants of NPLs, for example, cost efficiency, 
bad management, bad luck, institutional factors, moral hazard and macroeconomic factors (e.g. Berger and DeYoung, 
1997; Carey, 1998; Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis et al. 2011). However, there is a need to proceed from prior studies 
to investigate how banks anticipate NPLs, particularly, by making some balance sheet adjustments. Because NPLs 
cannot be accurately predicted due to adverse selection and moral hazard issues, managers take certain proactive steps 
or actions to minimize credit losses arising from problem loan. Therefore, this paper goes beyond the literature on NPL 
determinants to examine how managers anticipate NPLs. 
The main objective of this paper is to identify bank-specific variables that bank managers are likely to influence in 
anticipation of non-performing loans to minimize the size of NPLs. To address this question, we employ single-equation 
panel OLS regression. Second, I address the question on the interaction between NPLs and the state of the business 
cycle. Third, I note that distinctive characteristics of each country‟s banking industry and economic system are expected 
to have an effect on the size of NPLs. Therefore, in our robustness check, I undertake some country-specific analysis to 
observe whether country-specific differences show any significant results. Fourth, I propose that bank-specific 
determinants of NPLs may change as regulatory regimes change. Thus, I examine whether strict banking regulation in 
the post-crisis era translates into sound credit risk management leading to lower NPLs. 
The paper contributes to an extensive body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the interactions between 
NPL and macroeconomic conditions (e.g. Keeton and Morris, 1985; Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano, 2006; Quagliariello, 
2007; Jappelli, Pagano, and Marco, 2008; Espinosa and Prasad, 2010). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the 
first to combine regional bank samples and country-specific bank samples. I note that undertaking regional analysis 
does not capture country-specific factors; however, I maintain that banks tend to adopt some common „best practices‟ in 
credit risk management regardless of the region of the bank. Also, this paper is unique in that, unlike prior studies, we 
employ a different bank size variable, gross loan, as a proxy for bank diversification opportunities. The rationale for this 
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follows the view that NPL should have a direct impact on gross loan relative to total asset. Our findings in this paper 
indicate that bank managers anticipate NPLs by making balance sheet adjustments as a credit risk management practice. 
The results confirm that NPL has macro-financial linkage with the state of the business cycle in some countries. Also, 
our findings show evidence that bank loan portfolio may not be well-diversified. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature and develops the hypothesis for empirical testing. 
Section III presents the econometric methodology. Section IV reports and discusses the econometric results. Section V 
concludes and discusses the policy implications of our findings. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 NPLs and Loan Growth 
Clark (1992) examined the relation between loan growth and loan quality. Following Clark (1992)‟s theoretical 
framework, banks seeking to increase its overall market share might lower its underwriting standards to attract more 
loan customers. To attract new customers, banks might lower the non-price terms of the loan. Also, even if a bank 
maintains the same credit standards, it might possibly attract borrowers of lower loan quality, thus, increasing the risk 
exposure on the loan exposure. However, Anandarajan et al (2007) argue that the risk on bank loan portfolio depends on 
the quality of incremental loans. Therefore, the relationship between NPL and loan growth is likely to depend on the 
quality of incremental loans. Nonetheless, the quality of incremental loan or loan growth is often unobservable, thus, it 
is difficult to predict the relationship between NPL and loan growth. 
From a credit risk management perspective, when banks anticipate NPLs, bank managers would decrease lending in the 
current period to minimize expected credit loss. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between NPL and loan growth. 
2.2 NPL and Diversification Opportunities 
The literature suggests that banks‟ diversification opportunities may be related to loan quality (e.g. Salas and Saurina, 
2002; Hu et al. 2004; and Rajan and Dhal, 2003). These studies employed bank size (total asset) as a proxy for 
diversification. For example, Salas and Saurina (2002) find a significant negative relation between bank size and NPLs. 
They argue that large banks tend to be more diversified and that diversification reduces credit risk. Alternative measures 
of diversification have been employed. For example, Louzis et al (2011) employed total asset and non-interest income 
and did not find evidence to support the bank size diversification hypothesis. They concluded that bank size, proxy by 
total asset, does not fully capture diversification. Additionally, Louzis et al (2011) employed non-interest income as an 
alternative proxy for diversification effect, but did not find a significant negative relation between NPLs and 
diversification. Overall, empirical evidence for diversification effects on LLP appears mixed. In the present study, I 
consider using an alternative diversification proxy - size of gross loan, to observe whether there is any significant 
diversification effect. Bank size, proxied by size of gross loan, is expected to have a negative relationship with NPLs. 
This follows the reasoning that banks are expected to maintain a well-diversified loan portfolio. A diversified portfolio 
spreads credit risk across heterogeneous and unrelated debtors. This sharing of risk reduces the size of NPL relative to a 
non-diversified loan portfolio. 
2.3 NPLs and Macroeconomic Determinants 
The theoretical literature argue that the state of the economy is an most important factor influencing loss rates on 
diversified loan portfolios (e.g. Carey, 1998; Ruckes, 2004; Geanakoplos, 2010). The literature argue that in good 
economic times, banks tend to extend credit to low quality debtors but when a recession sets in, NPLs are expected to 
increase. Empirical studies appear to show consistent evidence for this macro-financial linkage (e.g. Quagliarello, 2007; 
Klein, 2013). For example, Quagliarello (2007) in a study of Italian banks from 1985-2002, found that the state of the 
business cycle is a determinant of NPLs. Klein (2013) examines NPLs in Central, Eastern and South- Eastern Europe 
(CESEE) countries to determine whether NPL is driven by macroeconomic factors. Klein (2013) examined the 
relationship between NPL and macroeconomic factors such as change in gross domestic factors, unemployment, and 
inflation. Klein (2013) found a strong negative relationship between NPL and the state of the business cycle proxy by 
change in gross domestic product. Other studies include: Keeton and Morris (1985), Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano 
(2006), Salas and Saurina (2002), Carey (2002), Pagano, and Marco (2008), Boss et al. (2009), and Espinosa and Prasad 
(2010). Therefore, consistent with prior studies, we expect a negative relationship between NPL and the state of the 
business cycle, proxied by change in gross domestic product. A negative sign indicates NPL is procyclical with the state 
of the business cycle. A positive sign would indicate counter-cyclical NPL behaviour. 
2.4 NPL and Loan Loss Reserves 
When banks expect NPLs, banks will increase loan loss provisions. Increase in provisions translates into increase in 
loan loss reserves. Thus, a positive relationship between NPL and reserves is expected. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 
Data used in this study were obtained from Thomson‟s (Bureau van Dijk) Bankscope Database. Annual bank data from 
the period 2004 to 2013 were extracted. Only banks with reporting data from 2004 to 2013 are included in the sample. A 
justification for this choice sample period is to capture significant economic downturns and upturns as well as the 
2007-2008 financial crisis.  To obtain large bank samples, I do not make any distinction between commercial banks 
and non-commercial banks. In all, the final sample is reduced to 82 banks which yield 820 bank-year observations. 
Surprisingly, I observe that some banks did not report NPL data for some years. Also, I note that the introduction of 
lagged variables in the model adjusts the beginning sample period from 2004 to 2005. After the adjustment, the final 
sample yields 679 bank-year observations. 
3.2 Model Specification 
The basic estimation strategy is to pool the observations across banks and undertake regression analysis on 
country-specific pooled sample. Pooling has the advantage of generating more reliable estimates in the model. However, 
the validity of pooled panel analysis depends on whether there is a reason to believe that the relationship between the 
variables is stable across cross-section units. While this assumption is unlikely to hold, pooling the data over time and 
across banks significantly increases the degrees of freedom. 
Given that banks in the same country face common economic shocks, panel least square is more appropriate to examine 
the behaviour of NPL for country-specific banking industry. The disadvantage of pooled panel is that heterogeneity 
across banks often reveals itself in the “unexplained” residuals or error term. Also, unlike studies that introduce country 
specific dummy variables into the model, I adopt country-specific regression model in order to allow country-specific 
peculiarities to be incorporated into the model. This follows the reasoning that country-specific factors have some 
impact on non-performing loans. 
Therefore, I adopt a modified model derived from existing NPL models in the literature (e.g. Louzis et al. 2011). The 
baseline model captures bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables. To capture bank-specific heterogeneity, I 
use panel OLS with fixed effects. The econometric model is, 
NPLit = LLRit + LOTAit + LOANit + InGLit + GDPt + ɛit 
Where, 
NPL = Non-performing loans for bank i at time t  
LOTA = total loan to total asset for bank i at time t 
LOAN = growth in gross loan for bank i at time t 
InGL = size of gross loan as a proxy for loan portfolio size for bank i at time t. 
GDP = change in gross domestic product for country at time t. A proxy for state of the business cycle.  
GDPt-1 = the previous state of the business cycle. 
 
The dependent variable is aggregate NPL. NPL is ratio of impaired loans to gross loan. The variables of interest are 
LLR, LOAN, InGL, LOTA, and GDP. LLR is the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. LOAN is the change in gross 
loan. LOTA is the ratio of gross loan to asset.  InGL is the natural logarithm of gross loan. GDP is the gross domestic 
product growth rate. These variables explain factors, within managerial control, that might help banks to predict or 
control the overall size of NPL to some considerable extent. 
  
I control for the riskiness of banks‟ asset composition by employing gross loan to asset variable (LOTA). We expect that 
banks with large loan assets relative to non-loan assets have greater exposure to credit losses than less risky banks. A 
significant positive sign on the LOTA variable would indicate that risky banks tend to have greater NPLs. On the other 
hand, if a negative sign on the LOTA variable is observed, it would indicate that loan assets of risky banks appear to be 
well-diversified, hence, low NPLs. 
 
Also, a positive sign is expected on LOAN variable. It follows the reasoning that increases in loan size is often 
associated with declining banks loan quality and, thus, increased NPLs. GDP and GDPt-1 tests whether NPL is 
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procyclical with the business cycle. This is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Salas and Saurina, 2002; Louzis et al, 2011; 
Klien, 2013). A negative sign indicates that NPL is procyclical with the business cycle, otherwise, positive. Finally, a 
negative relationship is expected between the InGL variable and NPL. 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the period 2004-2013 for our sample banks. The mean ratio of LLR to 
gross loan for the full bank sample are 2.58%. With regard to the credit quality of banks in our sample, non-performing 
loans (NPL) are, on average, 4.03% of gross loan. On average, growth in loan (LOAN) is 14.28%. With regard to the 
size of bank loan portfolio, the natural logarithm of gross loan (InGL) is 17.45% indicating a fairly stable loan portfolio. 
On average, the riskiness of banks total asset portfolio (LOTA) is 51.86 indicating that banks appear to be risky in their 
lending activities. On average, GDP is 4.02%. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  Total Region Some Countries 
Var. Statistic All banks Europe US Asia Africa UK China India Indonesia S/Africa 
LLR Mean 
Median 
S.D 
2.58 
2.04 
2.34 
2.34 
2.20 
1.42 
2.18 
1.91 
1.32 
2.55 
1.98 
2.09 
3.09 
2.09 
3.46 
2.13 
1.59 
1.56 
2.54 
2.30 
1.67 
1.75 
1.51 
1.27 
3.86 
2.80 
2.76 
1.72 
1.75 
0.69 
NPL Mean 
Median 
S.D 
4.03 
2.88 
4.42 
4.34 
3.74 
2.76 
3.09 
2.40 
3.27 
2.95 
2.32 
3.13 
5.95 
3.97 
6.63 
4.59 
3.41 
3.32 
1.83 
1.12 
2.49 
3.05 
2.99 
1.44 
4.09 
3.16 
3.51 
3.67 
3.58 
1.98 
LOAN Mean 
Median 
S.D 
14.28 
11.74 
20.06 
6.25 
2.24 
21.10 
9.16 
20.18 
20.17 
19.27 
16.86 
19.69 
17.57 
15.99 
16.30 
6.46 
2.35 
25.93 
20.84 
16.41 
18.57 
21.49 
20.53 
12.36 
27.62 
24.31 
22.42 
11.92 
12.01 
11.07 
InGL Mean 
Median 
S.D 
17.45 
18.00 
3.16 
19.05 
20.03 
2.31 
19.83 
20.17 
0.94 
17.51 
17.56 
2.54 
14.53 
14.17 
3.24 
19.47 
20.34 
1.86 
19.52 
19.55 
0.99 
16.56 
16.51 
0.72 
14.82 
14.96 
1.99 
17.61 
17.82 
0.58 
LOTA Mean 
Median 
S.D 
51.89 
52.50 
15.91 
44.76 
41.55 
15.48 
43.11 
43.86 
19.17 
55.20 
54.61 
13.81 
57.21 
56.26 
12.75 
41.87 
38.78 
12.45 
54.20 
52.32 
14.15 
55.35 
58.55 
8.21 
61.53 
63.15 
11.42 
61.67 
66.29 
13.61 
GDP Mean 
Median 
S.D 
4.02 
4.00 
3.69 
1.09 
2.00 
2.29 
1.70 
2.00 
1.89 
6.28 
6.00 
3.73 
4.66 
5.50 
2.68 
1.29 
2.00 
2.11 
10.04 
10.00 
1.89 
7.54 
8.00 
2.07 
5.82 
6.00 
0.39 
3.31 
4.00 
2.38 
Obsv  749 170 105 283 190 80 77 59 87 89 
4.2 Determinants of NPL 
Table 2 and 3 reports the determinants of NPLs. LLR is significant across all bank samples in Table 2 and 3. The 
implication is that reserves are likely to increase when banks anticipate increasing NPLs. Loan growth (LOAN) is 
negative and statistically significant for the full bank sample (Table 2a). Also, loan growth (LOAN) is significant and 
negative for US and African banks (Table 2b). This indicates that change in gross loan are, particularly, sensitive to 
credit risk considerations and that some regional banks tend to decrease growth in loan when they expect high NPLs. 
However, loan growth coefficient is statistically insignificant for European and Asian banks.  
Table 2: Determinants of NPL 
  2a  2b (Regional banks) 
  All banks US Europe Africa Asia 
Variables Exp./ 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
C ? 1.955 
1.13 
-3.116 
-0.36 
-3.376* 
-1.88 
2.232 
0.48 
0.835 
0.28 
LLR + 1.307*** 
23.97 
1.092*** 
6.74 
1.723*** 
17.98 
1.47*** 
11.15 
1.046*** 
11.39 
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LOAN - -0.019*** 
-3.68 
-0.016** 
-2.29 
-0.007 
-1.36 
-0.073*** 
-2.95 
-0.012 
-1.44 
InGL - 0.021 
0.22 
0.49 
1.02 
0.164** 
1.95 
-0.276 
-0.98 
-0.094 
-0.64 
LOTA +/- -0.021* 
-1.67 
-0.139*** 
-6.87 
0.01 
0.76 
0.108* 
1.86 
0.025* 
1.71 
GDP - -0.074* 
-1.82 
0.163** 
2.03 
-0.066 
-1.53 
-0.243 
-1.37 
-0.176 
-1.16 
Adj R²  74.42 83.16 80.69 80.21 4.03 
F-stat  26.31*** 35.25*** 30.44*** 28.03*** 9.64*** 
Obsv.  749 105 170 101 293 
Table 3 reports a negative and significant sign on the LOAN variable for all countries except Uganda and Indonesia. 
Moreover, I did not find any significant diversification effect influencing NPL for regional bank as indicated by the 
InGL variable. However, we find significant diversification effect for only Chinese banks in Table 3. LOTA coefficient 
appears to be negative and weakly significant for the full bank sample indicating that increased loan-to-asset ratio 
minimizes NPL. A possible explanation for this negative relationship is due to the fact that the loan component of total 
assets appears to be well diversified. Interestingly, LOTA coefficient is negative and strongly significant for US banks 
but is positive and weakly significant for Asian and African banks. The positive sign indicates that risky banks are likely 
to have higher NPLs. Also, we find that NPL is procyclical with the business cycle in the full sample as indicated by the 
GPR variable. However, the GDPR coefficient is positive for US banks indicating counter-cyclical NPL behaviour 
among US banks. This result is mostly insignificant for Asian, African and European banks except for Indian banks in 
Table 3. Overall, the result suggests that bank NPLs behaviour may be driven by regional banking differences. 
 
Table 3. Country-Specific Determinants 
 
  UK China India S/Africa Uganda Kenya France Indonesia 
Variables Exp./ 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
C ? -56.04*** 
-4.89 
16.81*** 
3.85 
9.649** 
1.99 
-54.322*** 
-4.27 
13.48 
0.99 
-19.67*** 
-2.82 
-4.839 
-0.75 
-9.633* 
-1.67 
LLR + 1.764*** 
13.65 
1.25*** 
23.61 
0.928*** 
9.55 
1.943*** 
6.04 
0.0001*** 
4.46 
1.651*** 
11.65 
1.509*** 
9.47 
1.043*** 
5.94 
LOAN - -0.016** 
-2.38 
-0.015** 
-2.43 
-0.027** 
-2.45 
-0.039** 
-2.59 
-0.005 
-0.17 
-0.089*** 
-2.90 
-0.021* 
-1.94 
-0.011 
-0.97 
INGL - 2.924*** 
4.87 
-1.024*** 
-5.57 
-0.479 
-1.57 
3.119*** 
4.28 
-0.501 
-0.41 
-0.221 
-0.79 
0.359 
1.09 
0.279 
1.33 
LOTA +/- 0.005 
0.18 
-0.026 
-1.45 
0.021 
0.83 
0.006 
0.49 
-0.055 
-0.73 
0.472*** 
4.81 
-0.058*** 
-3.14 
-0.007 
-0.15 
GDP - -0.043 
-0.56 
0.026 
0.42 
-0.114** 
-2.40 
0.051 
-0.96 
-1.955 
-1.07 
-0.049 
-0.24 
-0.047 
-0.98 
1.084* 
1.76 
Adj R²  83.97 92.77 77.32 82.15 75.65 83.19 90.92 64.49 
F-stat  33.23*** 76.09*** 20.78*** 29.93*** 15.76*** 28.01*** 41.03*** 13.01*** 
Obsv.  81 77 59 89 39 61 37 87 
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The reported adjusted R² in Table 2 and Table 3 is above 70% and 60%, respectively. The F-statistics shows that the 
variables jointly explains NPLs and are significant at the 1% significance level. 
4.3 Further robust Test 
4.3.1 NPL and Country-specific Influences 
Prior studies argue that the behaviour of NPLs may be driven by the uniqueness of a country‟s banking industry (Louzis 
et al 2011). Therefore, I analyse country-specific NPL behaviour. The advantage of country specific analysis is that it 
captures the peculiarities of a country‟s banking industry, institutional characteristics and relevant macroeconomic 
characteristics as well. Interestingly, table 4 reports a positive and strongly significant coefficient on the LLR variable at 
the 1% significant level.  This is consistent with Ozili (2015). Also, the result reports that LOAN is negative and 
statistically significant for banks in China, India, South Africa, Kenya and Indonesia but is insignificant for U.S and 
European banks (e.g. UK, France and Germany). This result indicates that banks in developing countries adjust the size 
of gross loan to minimize their risk exposure. The result is not significant result for US and UK banks. This suggests 
that banks in developed countries do not appear to anticipate the level of NPL by adjusting the size of gross loan. An 
explanation for this might be that banks in developed countries rely on alternative credit risk management mechanisms 
to anticipate the size of NPLs. Similarly, LOTA is negative and significant for US banks but is positive and significant 
for banks in India and Kenya. Also, InGL is negative and significant for Chinese banks but is positive and significant 
for banks in UK and South African banks. This result provides weak support for the hypothesis on diversification effect. 
 
Table 4. Robustness Check (Lagged variable and REG) 
 
Model NPL=LLR + LOAN + INGL + LOTA + REG + GDP + GDP(-1) 
 Full 
Sample 
US Europe Asia Africa Germany UK China India S/Africa Uganda Kenya  France Indonesia 
Var Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
C 3.24* 
1.77 
14.80 
1.29 
-4.208** 
-2.49 
2.89 
0.831 
3.663 
0.67 
-1.195 
-0.48 
-36.57*** 
  -3.45 
25.35*** 
4.56 
5.226 
0.62 
-67.08*** 
-4.54 
31.99 
1.44 
-17.19*** 
-2.54 
-1.994 
-0.27 
3.113 
0.39 
LLR 1.299*** 
21.06 
0.919*** 
4.12 
1.505*** 
15.01 
0.911*** 
7.00 
1.388*** 
9.31 
1.737*** 
7.37 
1.379*** 
10.41 
0.457*** 
2.83 
0.85*** 
7.07 
2.033*** 
6.29 
1.498*** 
3.74 
1.449*** 
8.94 
1.387*** 
7.31 
1.009*** 
5.11 
LOAN -0.019*** 
-3.43 
-0.007 
-0.82 
-0.003 
-0.58 
-0.014 
-1.35 
-0.077*** 
-2.88 
-0.007 
-0.79 
-0.006 
-0.93 
-0.018*** 
-2.83 
-0.043*** 
-3.42 
-0.041*** 
-2.70 
-0.011 
-0.33 
-0.101*** 
-3.27 
-0.021 
-1.62 
-0.025* 
-1.65 
INGL 0.001** 
0.015 
-0.499 
-0.79 
0.163** 
2.16 
-0.177 
-1.09 
-0.251 
-0.83 
0.093 
1.35 
1.842*** 
3.25 
-1.073*** 
-3.79 
-0.368 
-0.65 
3.928*** 
4.62 
-1.933 
-1.04 
-0.094 
-0.34 
0.252 
0.68 
0.604*** 
2.59 
LOTA -0.029** 
-2.15 
-0.109*** 
-4.41 
0.032* 
1.69 
0.019 
1.17 
0.13** 
1.95 
-0.011 
-0.27 
0.037 
1.37 
-0.028 
-1.62 
0.07** 
2.24 
-0.001 
-0.098 
-0.057 
-0.73 
0.483*** 
5.09 
-0.069*** 
-3.17 
-0.003 
-0.06 
REG -0.131 
-0.60 
1.313*** 
2.69 
1.043*** 
4.16 
-0.052 
-0.176 
-0.961 
-1.53 
0.344 
1.00 
1.89*** 
3.82 
-0.566 
-1.43 
-0.084 
-0.23 
-1.059*** 
-2.57 
0.358 
0.15 
-2.596** 
-2.13 
0.069 
0.34 
-0.983 
-1.53 
GDP -0.077* 
-1.81 
0.157* 
1.88 
-0.016 
-0.40 
-0.012 
-0.16 
-0.276 
-1.53 
0.004 
0.088 
0.033 
0.49 
-0.003 
-0.05 
-0.069 
-1.56 
-0.149** 
-2.29 
-0.491 
-0.99 
0.023 
0.11 
-0.049 
-0.93 
-0.169 
-0.19 
GDP(-1) -0.088* 
-1.91 
0.068 
0.704 
-0.05 
-1.19 
0.015 
0.19 
-0.287 
-1.41 
0.004 
0.085 
-0.081 
-1.03 
-0.158** 
-2.55 
-0.011 
-0.19 
-0.081 
-1.39 
-0.319 
-0.83 
-0.433* 
-1.83 
-0.098* 
-1.81 
-1.623 
-0.19 
 Adj R² 74.98 84.36 84.88 38.07 80.72 84.09 88.49 81.72 72.05 83.2 76.06 85.66 90.76 69.31 
F-stat 24.80*** 31.78*** 35.98*** 6.13*** 23.90*** 21.71*** 40.46*** 21.86*** 12.17*** 28.24*** 11.81*** 27.19*** 29.56*** 12.59*** 
Obsv. 700 98 163 268 94 48 78 71 53 89 35 58 33 78 
4.3.2 NPL and Regulation 
I introduce a regulatory dummy to indicate strict post-2008 strict banking regulation.  I investigate whether strict 
banking regulation leads to sound credit risk management and translates to lower NPLs for bank. Therefore, a negative 
relationship is expected.  
NPLit = LLRit + LOTAit + LOANit + InGLit + REG + GDPt +GDPt-1 + ɛit 
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The results are reported in table 4. Introducing the REG variable into the model improves the overall explanatory power 
of the model. A negative and insignificant sign on the REG coefficient is reported for the full sample. REG coefficient is 
negative and significant for banks in South Africa and Kenya but insignificant for Asian banks (China, India and 
Indonesia). On the other hand, REG coefficient is positive and significant for banks in US, Europe and UK. This result 
provides some interesting findings. 
First, the result seem to suggest that post-2008 banking regulation in developed countries was not necessarily aimed at 
reducing NPLs, particularly, because bank regulators believe that minimizing NPLs is the responsibility of banks not 
regulators. This explanation may be supported by the fact that banking regulation in developed counties (such as the US 
and UK) after the2008 crisis was aimed at regulating bank derivatives and securitization activities not bank loan 
portfolio. 
4.3.3 NPL and lagged business cycle effects 
I examine the inclusion of a lagged macroeconomic variable, particularly, one-year lagged GDPR variable.  
NPLit = LLR + LOTAit + LOANit + InGLit + GDPt +GDPt-1 + ɛit 
The result is reported in Table 4 above. The inclusion of lagged GDPR improves the explanatory power of the model. 
The lagged GDPR coefficient reports evidence of procyclical NPL behaviour for the full bank sample. This implies that 
there are cyclical interactions and macro-financial inter-linkages between NPL and the state of the economy. The result 
also reports procyclical NPL behaviour for banks in China, Kenya and France. 
5. Conclusion and Future Direction 
In this study, we use panel regression methods to examine bank specific factors to anticipate NPLs. I find that 
bank-specific variables such as loan loss reserves, loan growth and loan to asset ratio and state of the economy are 
important determinants of NPLs and possess significant explanatory power when incorporated into the baseline model. 
Also, we find some evidence for procyclical NPL behaviour suggesting that there are cyclical interactions and 
macro-financial inter-linkages between NPL and the state of the economy. Further, regulation does not appear to have a 
predictable relationship NPLs. I provide an explanation for this. Also, we can rely on future research to provide 
alternative explanation for this. 
Overall, we conclude that the significance and predictive power of each bank specific factor, regulatory variable and 
macroeconomic indicator in explaining NPLs depends on regional factors (less significantly) and country-specific 
factors (more significantly). The findings in this paper have implications for policy. Regulatory authorities should 
ensure that banks have robust risk management systems and that such system should be directed at minimizing NPLs. 
The need for regulators to curb risk-taking behaviour on derivatives and securitization-related activities should not 
undermine the need to mitigate credit risk exposure on banks‟ overall loan portfolio to ensure bank stability.  Future 
study can examine country-specific determinants of NPLs with the aim to understand how country-specific peculiarities 
affect NPLs. Also, further study may replicate this study and employ other proxies for loan diversification rather than 
total loan as a proxy for diversification. 
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